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ABSTRACT
Due to the recent war in Iraq, the Middle East has once against jumped to
the forefront of everyone‘s mind. The world has been focused on Iraq and Iran for a
decade now because Iran has established a strong foothold in Iraqi life since the
toppling of Saddam Hussein. However, in order to understand this issue and
attempt to solve it, an extensive study must be made of all the reasons that Iran is
succeeding where the United States has not.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the historical influence that Iran,
particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has had on Iraq since
its creation. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has taken over its home
country and a historical analysis will chronicle its rise. Case studies of Iran and
Iraq will be used to understand the geopolitical, military, economic, and religious
reasons for the IRGC‘s ever-increasing influence. Previous studies and news
coverage have only focused on one issue at a time; however, it is rare to find a study
which combines all the reasons. This thesis will not only compile an analysis of
these reasons, but will also explore and suggest what steps or policies Iraq can
adopt in order to prevent it from being a puppet to other world powers.

ii

DEDICATION
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my mother, whose support has given me the
drive to complete it. Also, to my brother who has always pushed me to strive for
greater things in life.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A great many thanks to Dr. Houman Sadri, my thesis chair who convinced me to
undertake this project and backed me every step of the way, to Dr. Özoglu and Dr.
Morales, who were both integral parts of my committee and to the Burnett Honors
College at UCF which gave me all the tools necessary to complete this endeavor.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1
Definitions .................................................................................................................. 4
Background ................................................................................................................. 4
CHAPTER 2 – THE RISE OF THE GUARDIANS ...................................................... 7
The Birth..................................................................................................................... 7
Pasdaran Forces ......................................................................................................... 8
Air Force, Army and Navy ...................................................................................... 8
Baseej-e Mostazafan – Mobilization Resistance Force .......................................... 9
The Quds Forces - The Jerusalem Forces ............................................................ 11
Increasing Influence ................................................................................................. 13
Pasdaran Influence Today ....................................................................................... 15
CHAPTER 3 – THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS IN IRAQ ...... 17
Why IRGC Vies For Power ....................................................................................... 17
Military Influence ..................................................................................................... 19
Political Influence ..................................................................................................... 22
Economic Influence................................................................................................... 24
v

Religious/Social Influence ........................................................................................ 28
CHAPTER 4 – ALL IS NOT LOST ............................................................................. 31
Present Pockets of Resistance .................................................................................. 31
Military Options ....................................................................................................... 32
Political Options ....................................................................................................... 36
Economic Options ..................................................................................................... 39
CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION.................................................................................... 42
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 58

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: IRGC Effects on Iraq ..................................................................................... 47

vii

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Iran and Iraq have brought to mind strong memories and emotions to people
around the world since the Ottoman and Persian Empire. The older generation
remembers the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Ba‘ath Party takeover of Iraq in
1968 and Saddam Hussein‘s subsequent presidency starting in 1979. Americans
specifically tend to remember the Gulf War in 1991 led by President George H. W.
Bush. The events of 9/11 and the Second Gulf War, initially led by President George
W. Bush, shot the Middle East into the minds of the younger generation and
encouraged the works of scholars to focus on that region. Clearly, the Middle East
has been an issue that the world cannot disregard.
Iran and Iraq have been fully aware of one another as well, with several
struggles between Arabs and Persians going back centuries. Some scholars even
claim that the modern era of the Middle East began with the arrival of Napoleon in
the Ottoman Empire through Egypt in 1798, and a following new era began with
the demise of the Ottoman Empire due to World War I.1 Therefore, it is not a
stretch to claim that the Middle East has been a quarrelsome region in the world.
Due to all of these events, including the Iran-Iraq War from 1980-1988, one can
understand how scholars have attempted to understand many different aspects –
military, political, economic and religious – of the array of issues that continue to
1

shape Iran and Iraq. These studies are critical not only for understanding such a
complex area of the world but also to attempt to construct resolutions that benefit
all the players involved.
Due to the many governmental positions that top members of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hold, some may claim that the IRGC is
operating as if it were the government. However, it has furthered its ambitions and
has continued to have a long standing, profound impact in Iraq as well. The IRGC‘s
influence affects the entire system in Iraq and those within it - including the top
government officials, the media, and the masses through their similar religious
beliefs. Its influence is seen through military power, also known as hard power,2 but
also through soft power, such as increased trade and greater diplomacy.3
While the American public was glued to their televisions watching the war
unfold, Iran was watching with equal vigor. When Saddam Hussein became the
Iraqi leader, his secularist rhetoric was an affront to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini4,
the prominent Shiite Imam who brought about the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and
created the Islamic Republic of Iran.5 Therefore, the capture, and subsequent
demise, of Saddam Hussein inspired no sympathy from the IRGC. In fact, it was
quite the opposite; Iran saw this liberation, as the American government called it,
as an opportunity that could not be passed by.
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Ironically, Iran has the same goal in Iraq as the United States – to create
stability. However, Iran would like to see a Shiite-dominated government through
the democratic process which would be easily achieved due to the Shiite majority in
Iraq. In 2005, the Shiites won a near majority because Iran financially supported
the Islamic Da‘wa party6, one of the oldest Shiite political movements in Iraq. This
was beneficial for Iran because Ibrahim al-Jaafari , who was then the Prime
Minister, was also the head of the Da‘wa Party and had spent the duration of the
Iran-Iraq War in Iran.7
If one can peel back the layers of the IRGC‘s influence and comprehend how
that influence is impacting the perspective of many Iraqis, then it may be easier to
formulate a plan in which the Iraqi people can combat this influence and become
truly autonomous. Combating the influence of the IRGC is of particular interest to
the Unites States (US) on the level of policy perspective because if Iraq does become
self-sufficient, it is possible for a workable relationship to be formed between the
two nations. However, the policy that the United States takes towards Iraq will also
influence the IRGC‘s response. Consider, for instance, if the United States
―democratized‖ Iraq. It is highly likely that Iran will feel threatened and possibly
invade Iraq, or in the worst-case scenario, carry out an attack against the United
States itself – most likely though terrorist attacks.
Conversely, if Iran managed to establish a stable and strong voice in Iraq,
then even if the United Nations heaped sanctions upon Iran, it could withstand
3

those because Iraq could supply Iran with what it needs to survive the onslaught.
An additional consideration is the potential of a backlash from the Middle East
should the UN put sanctions on both Iran and Iraq. Before any actions can be
taken; however, it is crucial to understand what has led Iran and Iraq down this
path.

Definitions
Due to the varying definitions that exist for ―power‖ and ―influence‖, an
explanation is required on how the words applied within this thesis. According to
the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, power is ―a possession of control or authority over
others‖ while influence is ―the act or power of producing an effect without apparent
exertion of force or direct exercise of command.‖

Background
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has been affecting their home state
since the moment of its creation following the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, created the IRGC in order to
protect the revolution. More specifically, the IRGC was created in order to protect
Khomeini from possible coups by pro-monarchial protestors, as well as the US.8
Under the current Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the IRGC has
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acquired near immeasurable power due to the president‘s appointment of current
and former members of the IRGC into state level and gubernatorial positions.9
In Iraq, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has most strongly affected
the politics, the economy and has also increased its influence by using the fact that
both Iraq and Iran are Shiite-majority nations. After Saddam Hussein was toppled
by the US in 2003, the IRGC entered Iraq in the hopes of stabilizing the war torn
nation for their benefit. The IRGC has poured money for reconstruction, cheap
goods, and services into the struggling Iraqi economy. It also provides electricity to
various parts of Iraq and has also supplied and trained Shiite insurgents.
Furthermore, Iran has close ties with many of the top leaders in Iraq today, most of
whom were previous exiles from Iraq.10
The United States has also, by default, assisted the IRGC in its goals by
simply toppling Hussein. There are a few factors associated with this but it is
mainly due to the ejection of the Sunni government from power.11 This is a primary
factor because a Shiite headed Iraqi government is much more likely to cooperate
with the Shiite led Iran, especially since Iran allowed Iraqi refugees to enter Iran
during the reign of the Ba‘ath regime, including current Prime Minister Nouri AlMaliki.12
However, it is far too early to claim that Iraq will become part of Iran. There
is resistance among the Iraqi Arabs. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the head cleric
5

in Iraq, does not believe that religious figures, such as himself, should be involved
in the government.13 Despite his extended stay in Iran, even al-Jafaari shares
Sistani‘s views.14 A stronger source of resistance is the fact that Iraqis view
themselves as Arabs first, not Muslims. Therefore, the tension between Iraqis and
the Persians continues to be a divisive issue and makes the Iranian influence
difficult to maintain.15
The thesis is not meant to cast judgment on Iran, Iraq, or the United States.
Its purpose is to bring understanding to the current situation as well as a history of
how it came to be. For any state to try to assist Iraq into becoming a self-sufficient
state, the analysis that this thesis undertakes is crucial. However, this thesis is
limited in that it does not explore every option. It does not examine the effects of
other states, such as Turkey, on Iraq. It also does not explore the Arab-Israeli
conflict and its effect on the evolution of the current Iraqi government. These issues
are important as well, but as Iran is Iraq‘s closest and largest neighbor, and is the
state having the most influence on Iraq today – despite the United States‘ efforts to
hold that position -, a thorough examination is vital. From the perspective of the
United States, Iran is of even greater concern in the ongoing struggle to be the
reigning hegemon. The idea that Iraq could be annexed by Iran, even figuratively16,
should be at the forefront of these considerations.
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CHAPTER 2 – THE RISE OF THE GUARDIANS

The Birth
During the Iranian Revolution of 1979, also known as the Islamic Revolution,
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was deposed and replaced by Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, who had recently returned from exile. With a newly formed Islamic
Republic in his hands, Khomeini created the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC) with the purpose of protecting the revolution from possible inside coups and
also silencing dissenters. The IRGC was intended to be the Iranian version of the
United States‘ National Guard, which answered only to the supreme leader.17
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has many names, including the
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, Pasdaran, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps – all of which are interchangeable. By whatever name it is known, however,
what remains is its ever increasing influence in every aspect of Iranian life. The
IRGC‘s influence has taken place through its main body and through its subgroups.
These groups include not only a personal army, air force and navy, but also the
Baseej - a home-front force, the Quds - an international force, and various other
paramilitary forces.18 Not only does the IRGC have jurisdiction to oversee domestic
and foreign operations, it controls Iran‘s missile forces and the IRGC alone can
patrol Tehran – Iran‘s capital city.19
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Pasdaran Forces
Air Force, Army and Navy
The IRGC is equipped with its unique ground forces, air force and navy.
Unfortunately, due to a lack of solid information flowing from Iran, it is extremely
difficult to ascertain how many men are involved in these forces. In 2006, the
Pasdaran Air Force was reported to operate three Shabab-3 missiles.20 The Shabab3 is a ballistic missile of intermediate range – 1,000 km – which are based on the
design of North Korea‘s No Dong-1 missile. The No Dong-1 is capable of carrying up
to an 800 kg warhead.21 However, in 2008, new information showed that Iran has
up to 100 Shabab-3 missiles that have been modified and can now reach up to 1,600
km and deliver a 1,158 kg warhead. In addition, Iran also has been developing the
Shabab-6 missile, which can reach roughly 10,000 km and deliver a 1,220 kg
warhead.22 Clearly, Iran is quickly developing their ballistic missile capability along
with its quest for nuclear capability.
The ground forces of the IRGC are composed of an ―army‖ and all
paramilitary forces, including the Baseej. Together they have been reported to be
composed of 130,000 men. This estimate includes the soldiers in the regular army.
The structure of the ground forces is uncertain but they conduct a variety of
training exercises in decentralized, guerilla warfare, most of which are meant to
8

prepare the soldiers against an attack by the United States. They are in control of
the tanks, attack helicopters and IEDs (improvised explosive devices).23 The IRGC
navy is in control of a variety of ships and bases that protect oil platforms but also
ensure basic defense for Iran. Furthermore, this navy, composed of roughly 25,000
men, is capable of conducting various exercises, similar to US Marines, and raids on
other shipping vessels in the Gulf.24

Baseej-e Mostazafan – Mobilization Resistance Force
The Baseej (Basij) Force is a volunteer militia created simultaneously with
the IRGC by Khomeini in 1979, although it did not come officially under the control
of the IRGC until 1981.25 It is estimated that about 800,000 Baseej volunteers were
sent to the front line of the Iran-Iraq War and were the main force responsible for
martyr-style deaths during that time.26 Today, the Baseej is entrusted with internal
riot suppression as well as controlling the dissenters, whether they are peaceful or
not. Because it is composed of average volunteers from all walks of life, such as
farmers, teachers, students, government workers and various other sectors27, the
Baseej also is used to draw information from the public – similar to a secret police , and to ensure that Islamic Sharia law is followed.28 Baseej numbers are difficult to
attain given that so little information is provided by the IRGC; however, in 2008 the
then commander of the Baseej, Hasan Taeb, reported to Fars News that 13.6
million people are in the Baseej. This number includes women and schoolchildren;
9

therefore, how many military age men and women are able to pick up arms is still
disputed.29
There are five units within the Baseej – Pupil (also called Seekers), Student
(Vanguard)30, University, Public Service and Tribal. The Pupils are school-aged
children who are indoctrinated into the system at an early age and inculcate the
next generation.31 Also, the Baseej is separated into men‘s and women‘s battalions.
Al-Zahra is the women‘s battalion while Ashura is the men‘s. Together they are
composed of roughly 2,500 battalions.32
The Baseej has been trained to attack US military troops should they invade
Iran. Through their practice of deception and camouflage that is capable of
deceiving modern imagery coverage, they have practiced dispersing into smaller
teams and executing effective ambushes. This is a useful arrangement because each
small Baseej team could work independently of a central command; thus making
them harder to find and extract information from. They are meant to be a strike
force and attack isolated units.33
Throughout the years, the Baseej has been in limbo between being under
direct control of the IRGC and being its own separate organization. In 1981, the
Baseej went under the control of the Ministry of the Interior; however, it never
actually separated itself from the IRGC.34 In 2007, Major Mohammad Ali Jafari was
appointed as the Commander and Chief of the IRGC by Grand Ayatollah Ali
10

Khamenei. Jafari officially merged the Baseej into the IRGC due to his assessment
that both the Baseej and the IRGC were a ―military-political-cultural organization
sharing the same goals…‖35 He also stated that since many of the IRGC‘s missions
are assigned to the Baseej, they should be combined. However, Jafari also promised
that the Baseej would not be swallowed into the IRGC.36
Conversely, since the 2009 election, and the riots that followed, some scholars
are speculating that the Baseej is deteriorating. Particularly after the Baseej shot
many protesters, its leadership role in suppressing opposition has been minimal.37
In addition, Hossen Taeb was removed from his position as leader of the Baseej in
October 2009 and the Baseej was officially integrated with the IRGC under
Brigadier General Muhammad Naghdi.38

The Quds Forces - The Jerusalem Forces
Within the IRGC, the Quds are the elite force. The majority of their missions
are composed of international operations. They work with Hezbollah in Lebanon
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The Quds force
has even been reported to have ongoing operations in Argentina.39 Their primary
objective is the training of Islamist terrorist groups and organizations. The Quds
operate in many states including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North African
countries.40 Furthermore, the Quds force has had increasing influence in Iraq since
11

the Iran-Iraq War. Roughly 12,000 Arabic-speaking Shiites from various countries
make up the Quds branch of the IRGC and roughly 15,000 Iranian Shiites are in
the Quds.41 In Iraq, the Quds have made efforts to infiltrate Iraq‘s southern region,
which contains a large Shiite majority. 42 In Iraq, the Quds do not wear uniforms,
whether military or other, making them difficult to identify in the nation. However,
they engage in both recruitment/training and locating pro-Iran Shiite governors in
each province where they operate. In addition, they organize the shipment of
weapons from Iran to Iraqi militias.43 General Petraeus, the commander of the
American forces in Iraq, reported to Congress in 2007 that the US had found Quds
operatives in Iraq and with them, found hard drives that had documents planning
and approving an attack that resulted in the death of five American soldiers in
Karbala.44
The Quds force has different groups for each country that they operate within
and many of their bases are outside of Iran. In addition, this force has offices in
various Iranian embassies, although the sections of these embassies are closed off to
all other staff. Due to the lack of knowledge about this branch of the IRGC, it is
unknown whether or not the ambassadors themselves have control of or any
knowledge about what the Quds do within the embassy or the country where they
reside.45 Additionally, the Quds work closely with the IRGC Intelligence Branch,
which is made up of roughly 2,000 members. This branch is entrusted with
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gathering information from everywhere in the Muslim world and participating in
the trials of those accused of working against the Revolution.46
Another speculation is whether or not the funds for the Quds force are
actually recorded in the Iranian budget or if they get special funds directly from the
Supreme Leader Khamenei. If Khamenei supplements the Quds‘s funding, they
may have more funds at their disposal than anyone is aware of. The biggest
example of their power and influence, however, occurred in January 2007, when
Iran‘s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), transferred control of all Iranian
operations in Iraq under the Quds authority.47

Increasing Influence
Since their creation, the IRGC has been used for a variety of tasks both
within and outside of Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini used the Guards to silence
dissenters of the revolution and political adversaries early on, although he did not
agree with the politicization of the Guards.48 In his ―Political and Divine
Testament‖, Khomeini said that no military personnel were to involve themselves in
any form of politics, including joining a political party. Furthermore, Khomeini
emphasized that military leaders should forbid, without exception, the entrance of
their subordinates into political practices.49
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Despite this rhetoric, Khomeini immediately used the IRGC to completely
purge the political system in Iran. The first party to feel the might of the new IRGC
was the Tudeh Party. This communist party was accused of being followers of Stalin
and was vilified by national papers until its leaders were imprisoned. Following the
Tudeh Party, the next to feel the might of the new IRGC was the then Prime
Minister Bazargan who had tried to persuade Ayatollah Khomeini to not involve the
Guards in politics. However, the Prime Minister was forced to resign following the
hostage crisis.50 The trend continued even after Khomeini‘s death and the Guards
soon succeeded in ousting Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, the first president of the Islamic
Republic. This attack came after Bani-Sadr tried to rein in the Guards‘ already
growing voice in the political arena.51
Following Bani-Sadr, Ali Khamenei and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani both
attempted but failed to depoliticize the Guards during their respective presidencies.
Rafsanjani even went so far as bribing the IRGC members to stay away from
politics; however, this backfired because his bribes were used to fund the IRGC's
agenda which was composed of accusing Rafsanjani of being a liberal.52 The Guards
used every source available to their disposal to further their reach.
Even the courts were used to silence the media and other dissenters, starting
after Mohammad Khatami took the presidency in 1997. Many papers and
magazines, including student publications, were banned throughout Khatami‘s
presidency. Reasons included the amount of criticism that the IRGC was facing due
14

to its involvement in politics and the belief that intellectuals must respect the
Guards because they protect the revolution.53

Pasdaran Influence Today
Despite these leaps of political influence, at no time has the IRGC gained so
much power and influence as under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The
IRGC, particularly the Baseej, helped quell political protests after the disputed
presidential election in June 2009. The Guards now hold various political positions
throughout Iran. These positions include mayors, cabinet ministers – of commerce,
defense, oil, welfare, and justice-, and top leaders at the state-run economic
institutions. 54
The top members of the IRGC are also heavily involved in Iran‘s nuclear
program. Between 2006 and 2007, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, the IRGC
commander, Brigadier General Morteza Rezai, the Deputy Commander, as well as
the leaders of the naval branch, ground forces – including the al-Quds and the
Baseej, had their assets frozen under United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Resolution 1747.55 The fact that the UN targeted specific commanders in the
resolution shows how deeply entrenched the IRGC is in Iran. The IRGC commands
and operates all of Iran‘s Scud missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and
researches new military technologies. Furthermore, the IRGC controls Iran‘s
15

defense industry and buys arms and military parts through many cover
organizations.56
With all this power within its own county, along with its fanatical dogma, it
is no wonder that outside global institutions, such as the UN, are having such a
difficult time keeping a rein on the IRGC. Now that Iraq is in a transition phase
and the US public and government is insisting on a pullout from the region, Iran is
taking up the role of directing the footsteps of that nation.

16

CHAPTER 3 – THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
CORPS IN IRAQ

The IRGC is still very much supportive of Khomeini‘s dream, including the
idea of exporting the revolution throughout the world. With this belief and the
current unstable nature of Iraq, it comes as no surprise that Iran has begun to move
into the state. This influence has taken many forms, including political, military,
economic, and religious. In addition, the IRGC uses its previous political ties, the
media, and religious rhetoric to spread its belief. Both the IRGC and the United
States acknowledge that US forces cannot be in Iraq forever while Iran is right next
door.57 This poses a threat to Iraq‘s attempt at becoming fully autonomous due to
Iran‘s constant and pervasive reach.

Why IRGC Vies For Power
The reasons for Iran‘s interest in Iraq are speculative; however, all are
plausible. Iran could use Iraq as a buffer zone, or as an additional ally, should any
outside powers decide to attack. If the IRGC can create enough of an influence in
Iraq and keep it weak enough to prevent another powerful dictator – who disagrees
with them – from coming to power, then Iraq will be under Iran‘s thumb.58
Politically, if Iran took over Iraq, they could propagate the religious factor,
17

suggesting that this new control is a sacred mandate and legitimizes the role of the
Iranian government as it stands, and thus has the right to crush any calls for
political reform. Essentially, Iran‘s interest in Iraq is a mixture of domestic interest
and religious aspirations.
Considering their similar Shiite beliefs, Iran could hope to strengthen the
relationship between the two countries. Even Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is from
Iran.59 Also, two of the holiest cities in the Shiite sect of Islam, Narjaf and Karbala,
are located in Iraq. Better relations would encourage more pilgrimage between the
two nations.60 Also, due to the Iran-Iraq War, there were many exiles in Iran,
making, Iran‘s influence even stronger with those ex-refugees, many whom hold
prominent positions in the Iraqi government today.
Lastly, Iran feels overtly threatened with the Unites States‘ influence in the
region. However, the IRGC has to be very careful in how it approaches the
situation. On the one hand, it does not want all out civil war because that could spill
over into their borders. Furthermore, a civil war could also recreate the same
situation as the Iran-Iraq War in which many refugees poured into Iran. A rise in
refugees could further destabilize the Iranian Kurdish and Arab citizens.61 In
addition, although the IRGC does not want an Iraq that is friendly with the West, it
is to its benefit to want democracy in Iraq because of the Shiite majority.62 Through
the different tactics demonstrated below, one can see how it is attempting to
navigate this narrow path.
18

Military Influence
Due to Saddam Hussein‘s early ousting of Shiites to Iran, coupled with
Shiites who left of their own accord, Iran had many Iraqi exiles and refugees living
within its borders until the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.63 The Quds force was a
main reason for the creation of the Badr Corps, which were made up of Iraqi exiles
in Iran and operated under the Quds.64 The Badr Corps received around $20 million
a year to support the revolution and conduct operations with the purpose of
assassinating Saddam Hussein.65 Though the war was a military failure on both
sides, leaving one million dead and roughly three million wounded66, Iran continued
holding an influence on the Badr Corps in Iraq.
After the 1991 Gulf War, the Badr were called upon to recruit members from
the various Shiite exiles. The Badr Corps also created network which they used to
ease smuggling people and arms into Iraq, still with the overall purpose of
assassinating Hussein and destroying the Mujahideen-e Khalq, which were Iranian
exiles who cooperated with the Ba‘ath Party because they believed in overthrowing
the Islamic Republic of Iran.67 In 2003, under tremendous outside pressure, the
Badr Corps became the Badr Organization; however, it continued to receive
monetary support from Iran and numbered around 10,000 men.68 Furthermore,
many Badr members were given positions in the Iraqi government and some
incorporated into the Iraqi Security Forces.69

19

The Badr Organization is now acting as a police force in many areas in
southern Iraq, such as Basra.70 With the growing amount of sectarian violence
between the Sunnis and Shiites, the monetary assistance from Iran to the Badr
causes a major problem; furthermore, the Badr have also been pursuing former
Ba‘athist leaders, both military and political, in order to exact revenge for the IranIraq War.71 If a civil war were to erupt, it would cause Iraq to remain weak; thus
being more malleable towards Iranian interests.72 However, to reiterate, it is more
beneficial for Iraq to be somewhat stable as to prevent the civil war from spilling
over into Iran‘s borders.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has supported many other groups as
well, namely the Jaish al Mahdi (JAM), the personal militia of Moqtada al-Sadr – a
radical Shiite cleric in Iraq.73 JAM was trained by the Lebanese Hezbollah,
particularly Ali Mussa Daqduq, who also received training by the IRGC, and after
2004, the IRGC began giving JAM ―explosively formed penetrators‖ (EFPs) and
other weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades and rocket launchers.74 In April
2004, JAM engaged US troops both in Baghdad and Najaf while attempting to
annihilate the Sunni population.75 EFPs are especially dangerous because they are
shaped like copper disks and can penetrate heavy armor by the sheer power of the
explosives.76 JAM also started to be trained in Iran by the Hezbollah as well as the
Quds.77 A reason for Iran to furnish such support for JAM is that this militia has
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become the scapegoat for insurgent sectarian violence, thus taking attention away
from the Badr Organization and making it seem less responsible.78
After 2006, the Quds separated the Iraq militias into cells, similar to
Hezbollah. Qais Khazali was chosen to head the new network because of his close
relations with Sadr. The new organization was named Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and
Ali Mussa Daqduq was the middleman between the AAH and the Quds. Funding for
this new network was generous, being somewhere between $750,000 to 3 million
dollars in arms and training.79 The 2007 killing of five US soldiers at the Karbala
Provincial Joint Coordination Center, in addition to the kidnapping of five British
citizens in Baghdad, was attributed to the AAH. After the attack, much evidence
was gathered, which resulted in the arrest of Khazali and Daqduq. Three of the
kidnapped men were killed and Peter Moore was held by the Quds force for two
years before his release. The condition of his freedom was the release of Qais alKhazali, a leading cleric in the AAH. It was found that Moore was a target of the
IRGC and the AAH because he was installing a system that would show how a large
amount of international aid was in fact being used to fund Iranian militia groups in
Iraq.80 The attacks continued through 2008. And even today, there are still
insurgents who continue to go to Iran for training, then return to Iraq and attack
both the US soldiers and other Iraqis who do not comply.81
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Political Influence
Along with military influence, Iran has been exerting its political arm in Iraq.
Because of the rush of Iraqi exiles returning after Saddam, coupled with the
debaathification process led by the US, Iran has managed to become extremely
involved in Iraqi politics. Under Lieutenant Paul Bremer, the 2003 debaathification
process had two steps. First, it made the Ba‘ath Party illegal and dismissed roughly
some 30,000 ex-Ba‘athists from their government positions; second, it purged the
Iraqi military of roughly 500,000 members.82 Although Bremer attempted to
dismantle the debaathification commission after claiming it was implemented
unjustly and poorly, Iraq‘s interim government decided to keep the debaathification
process in place.83
Interestingly enough, however, Iran has been favorable towards the
democratic process in Iraq. Their support is only harnessed because, since Iraq is
mostly Shiite – roughly 60% -,84 the IRGC understands that a democratic process
would easily launch the Shiites into power. Indeed, in 2005, the Shiites did gain
political power under the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), who won 128 of the 275 seats
in December of 2005.85 The UIA includes the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI), previously known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), and the Da‘wa (Islamic Call) party, which is very pro-Iranian.86
Furthermore, Moqtada al-Sadr is included in the UIA, and since Sadr is currently
in Iran studying to become an Imam87, his inclusion is beneficial to the IRGC.
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The ISCI was created under Ayatollah Khomeini and control the Badr
Brigades, or the Badr Organization as it is now referred to. During the Iran-Iraq
War, the ISCI fought for the Iranian side. The previous ISCI leader, Abdul Aziz alHakim, returned from Iran in 2003 and was also the head of the UIA. Al-Hakim
was pushing for an autonomous southern province in Iraq, specifically for Shiites.
Iran fully supported this legislation because an autonomous Shiite area would
theoretically turn to Iran for any economic and political assistance.88 His son,
Sayyed Ammar al-Hakim now heads the party. Another member of ISCI was
Humam Hamoudi, the Chair of Constitutional Committee, who worked closely with
al-Hakim. Finally, the former commander of the Badr Brigade, Bayan Jabr, was a
senior member of the UIA and served as the Ministry of the Interior. He served as a
member of the ISCI bureau in Lebanon and Syria after living in exile in Iran during
the Iran-Iraq War.89
Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari and current Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki are both members of the Da‘wa Party. Al-Jaafari was the head of the
Da‘wa Party during his term as Prime Minister and had spent ten years in exile in
Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, though he later moved to London.90 Nouri al-Maliki
was a resistance fighter in Iraq during Saddam‘s reign, although he fled after
learning of several assassination attempts planned for him. Even so, there were still
attempts on his life. He first went to Jordan, then to Syria, and lastly to Iran in
1982 where he lived for eight years. In 1990 he returned to Syria until 2003, after
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Saddam was deposed. Prior to his appointment as the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri
al-Maliki was a member of the Debaathification Committee from 2003 to 2005 and
the Head of the Defense Committee from 2005 to 2006.

91

In 2005, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, called Iran a ―brother
country‖ and had been cooperating with Iran in order to root out terrorism and
deepen relations between the two states.92 The relationship between Iran and Iraq
is expected to grow according to almost all leaders on both sides. The concern is
whether or not Iraq will continue to maintain its autonomy despite the increasingly
expanding influence of Iran.

Economic Influence
In addition to military and political influence, Iran and the IRGC have been
extensively working on become inexorably intertwined with the Iraqi economy. This
has included the influx of Iranian goods into the Iraqi economy and the ―donation‖
of funds towards Iraqi reconstruction, while providing energy to certain key areas in
Iraq.
Due to the tremendous economic sanctions in Iraq during the 1990‘s, the
Iraqi economy had been on a downward spiral, which had been exacerbated by
sectarian violence throughout the country throughout the stay of the US troops.93
When the United States took over in 2003, the US Coalition Provisional Authority
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opened the economy by suspending duties and tariffs on imported goods in hopes of
jump-starting the devastated economy. Unfortunately, this opened up the Iraqi
economy to Iran, which wasted no time sweeping into the nation.94
In a short time, Iran has become Iraq‘s largest trading partner. In 2006,
Iranian exports were over $1.8 billion – a large leap from $800 million just two
years earlier. Assisting this increase was the free-trade zone in the south,
particularly Basra, where the rial – Iranian currency – is used. 95 A commonly cited
statistic in 2007 showed that since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the trade between
Iran and Iraq has grown steadily by 30% a year.96 By 2009, bilateral trade was
estimated at $4 billion.97 Furthermore, Iran has also subsidized its exports to Iraq,
which lowers the price of Iranian goods in Iraqi markets. While Iran is subsidizing
its exports to Iraq, at the same time it has also raised import tariffs to 150%,
making it impossible to maintain a trade balance.98
However, these estimates are somewhat uncertain due to the lack of numbers
being released from Iran.99 The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister of Finance, Barham
Salih, claims this is a problem because it is a one-way trade. The Iraqi Foreign
Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurd, claims that there are a number of agreements
between Iran and Iraq regarding trade, energy, oil and pilgrims. 100 Most Shiite
political leaders in Iraq today say that this relationship will only strengthen. Iran is
attempting to double trade to $8 billion by the end of 2010.101
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Even today, however, Baghdad is overrun with Iranian air conditioners,
books, busses, rice, and bricks - something Iraq was renowned for.102 Basra alone
imports $45 million worth of a variety of goods including construction materials,
fish, carpets and spices, according to Muhammad al-Waeli, the governor of Basra.103
In many cases, Iran is truly providing products at a cheap price that Iraqi‘s could
not otherwise afford. However, in the case of bricks, for example, Iran is
undermining local businesses, which is destroying job creation in the fragile nation.
Many Iraqi businessmen and manufacturers feel that this is not fair because Iraq is
not strong enough to compete without enacting protectionist policies.
In Nahrwan, a city located just northeast of Iraq, many brick factories are
going out of business due to imports from Iran.104 One brick factory owner, Dhary
al-Shimary, is extremely worried about having to shut down his factory again.
Though he was able to hire back many of his workers, the factory was attacked by
Al-Qaeda and most of his transformers were damaged. Shimary is worried about
what his workers will do if they are jobless. With a 28% unemployment rate for
males between 15 and 29, may worry about how they will feed their families. One
worker claims that he used to work for Sunni insurgents and plant explosives, not
for shared beliefs, but because they paid him well.105
Electricity is another crucial necessity for Iraq and it may cause some to
think Iran is being selfless towards its Shiite neighbors; however, the reliance of
Iraq on Iranian energy only gives Iran another way to manipulate the populace.
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Basra was shown this first hand when, in 2008, Iran shut down the electricity to
Basra following the Iraqi‘s government attempt at a crackdown. Even though they
did eventually restart the electricity, the Iraqi government has still to transfer the
electricity sector back to Iraq. 106
The border cities along the Iran-Iraq border are where much of Iranian funds
can be seen in the form of electricity. According to the Iraqi electricity minister,
Karm Wahid, Basra, the second largest city in Iraq, will soon have the capacity to
draw 250 megawatts of power from Iran for only 5.2 cents per kilowatt-hour. Dilaya
Province, which is northeast of Baghdad, imports 120 megawatts for a slightly
higher price.107 Altogether, as of 2009, Iran supplies 750 Megawatts of electricity to
Iraq as well as supplying fuel to several power stations in Iraq.108
Iran has also become very involved in the banking system in Iraq, so much so
that in 2007 Bank Melli opened a branch in Baghdad. Bank Melli has been tagged
by the US Treasury as being the main bank that purchases materials for Iran‘s
nuclear ambitions and funds the Quds Force, which, in turn, funds the insurgent
militias in Iraq.109 Other banks involved are the Tejarat Bank and the Export
Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), who have opened branches in Sulaymaniyah,
and several others have opened in Karbala, Najaf and Baghdad.110 Could it be that
the Iraqi populace simply does not know about the connection of these banks to the
insurgent militias in their country? And if they did know, what could cause them to
ignore this connection? For the government it could be a matter of going along with
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Iran for the time being, considering their unstable position; however, for the people
it could just be a matter of necessity, much like the brick worker who worked for the
Sunni insurgents.

Religious/Social Influence
Finally, one of the most difficult aspects to combat when it comes to curbing
influences is the religious ties between Iran and Iraq. With only four Middle
Eastern countries holding a Shiite majority, and only three having a Shiite-led
government, similar religious beliefs form close ties among those of the same faith;
however, these ties are being manipulated by Iran to spread their power.
Looking back to the Iran-Iraq War, Iran took in many Shiite exiles, and so,
was sympathetic to their cause in Iraq. Also, Iran has donated a considerable
amount of funds towards the reconstruction of Najaf and Karbala, two of the holiest
cities in Shiite belief. Najaf was provided with $20 million a year in order to
improve the city for tourists. Karbala received even more funds and was part of a
$100 million project to renovate the area around the shrines of Imam Hussein and
his brother, Abu Fadhil al-Abbas – prominent figures in Shiite Islam. 111
Two schools of thought rule Shiite Islam regarding politics – Quietism and
the Khomeinist tradition. As their name suggests, the Quietists believe that clerics
should never become involved in politics. Instead, clerics should focus on leading
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their followers. The Najaf Hawza, the older Shiite seminary, adheres to this
tradition.112 Conversely, those who follow the Khomeinist tradition believe that
clerics should control everything, including politics, religious and social matters.
The Qom Hawza follows the Khomeinist vision113, as Qom is the city in which
Khomeini lived during the periods he was in Iran. The rebirth of Najaf as a center
for Shiite learning has brought a challenge to Qom and to the Iranian Shiite belief
about religious control of the government. Thus, by investing in the reconstruction
of Najaf and Karbala, Iran could be planning on controlling what emerges out of the
competing hawzas.114
Also, media is a common way in which governments try to influence and
control the populace, particularly in lesser democratic nations. The IRGC, however,
has taken to spreading its message in Iraq through its own television stations. Iran
has a channel that broadcasts in Iraq called Al-Alam. It began in 2003 and
broadcasted propaganda which compared US coalition troops to the Israelis in
Palestine. Al-Kawthar, which started up in 1997, is another Iranian station that
broadcasts in Iraq. Previously known as Al-Sahar, it is mostly neutral on Iraqi
affairs; however, the station is extremely anti-Israel and refers to it as the
―usurping entity‖. Not much better is said about the Unites States due to the
station‘s support of the Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestine‘s Hamas.115
Social influence in Iraq is tied to religious influence but has more immediate
visible repercussions. For instance, parts of the IRGC have infiltrated southern
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Iraqi cities and are enforcing Sharia. They are forcing women to wear hijab, as well
as beating and/or killing unaccompanied women or couples that are not related to
one another. 116 Though religious in intent, the IRGC is destabilizing the current
social standards of many Iraqis and gearing them towards acceptance of and strict
adherence to Sharia law.
It is clear that Iran is entrenching itself in the creation of the new Iraq. Even
though President Mahmoud Ahmadenijad said that Tehran has ―one soul in two
bodies‖, and went onto say that Iran is fully supportive of a democratic Iraq, it is
highly possible that this statement is only valid as long as Iraq gives unilateral
support to Iran and the IRGC in their endeavors.
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CHAPTER 4 – ALL IS NOT LOST

Present Pockets of Resistance
Despite mounting concerns regarding Iraq‘s future as an independent and
self-sufficient nation, there are still those who resist the IRGC‘s encroachment.
Many Sunnis are extremely wary and sensitive about the IRGC‘s growing influence.
Their concern is both due to their minority status and because, as some insurgent
militias have shown, Sunnis are being singled out for victimization – particularly
the ex-Ba‘athists. Iranian influence only serves to heighten the tension between the
factions and cause Sunnis to fear that they will become the silenced minority in
Iraq. Some Shia‘s are equally upset at the reach of Iran‘s hand within Iraq, though
for different reasons than the Sunnis. Although they share the same faith, Iraqi
Shiites are Arab, unlike their Persian counterparts in Iran. This divide has been
present for centuries and continues to be a primary divisive issue.117 Furthermore,
many Shiites disagree with the theocratic dictatorship in Iran and are infuriated
with the IRGC‘s attempts to infiltrate their country and enforce their code of law.
Although Sharia law is a Muslim code, not all Muslims believe it should be the
enforced justice code.
Lastly, there is still much resentment and anger remaining from the IranIraq War. Although not many Iraqis believed in fighting for Saddam Hussein, many
of them lost relatives in the war and harbor that loss to this day. To be aware of an
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insidious Iranian takeover, even though it is not military, is to perceive that the
Iran-Iraq War is being lost. Although powerful, these pockets of resistance are not
enough to push back Iran or the IRGC. The Iraqi government has to take action in
order to secure its autonomy. There are choices, of course, on how the government
should approach this task – whether through military, political or economic means.
However, any of these options or combinations will be met with fierce resistance
and, therefore require preparation. These preparations will require the assistance
not only from the international community, but also the cooperation of the
government leaders – a difficult task when one considers how many of the members
still harbor loyalty towards Iran.

Military Options
Iraq has been taking steps to stabilize the nation with the help of the United
States and partially from Iran. However, Iraq has not resolved to take direct
military action against Iran due to many reasons. The most daunting reason is that
Iran could incite more violence should they feel threatened by Iraq. Conversely,
since 2007 the United States has officially been searching for IRGC members in
Iraq, after President Bush admitted that he did order the missions to combat the
IRGC and end their aid to insurgents.118 Unfortunately, President Bush also
declined a request from the Iraq Study Group – a ten-person bipartisan group
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funded by Congress to assess the situation in Iraq and ways to resolve the many
issues surrounding the new government -119 to open negotiation with Tehran in
order to find a common ground on how to end sectarian violence in Iraq.120
Instead, the US and Iraq have employed some of the militias with the
purpose of quelling the violence. Specifically, the United States has agreements
with the Sunni militia named al-Sahwa121, and the Shiite militia named The Wolf
Brigade.122 Both brigades are powerful forces in Iraq because they are additions to,
though not part of, the official army of Iraq. Though this action seems to be a
tangible step towards calming the populace of Iraq, the hired brigades have been
accompanied by their own internal hassles, and the issue of whether or not they are
to be incorporated into the official security forces is raising tensions among several
factions in Iraq.123
Al-Sahwa (Awakening) was initially formed in order to decrease bloodshed in
Azamiyah, a city just north of Baghdad, after a call to arms from a local imam,
Sheik Ahmed Taha al Samarrai.124 Soon after, the US forces took over and formally
trained the militia and recruited members from neighboring Sunni clans. These
men, roughly 80,000, were receiving about $300 per month from the US in order to
combat al-Qaeda and not attack US troops. Presumably, the latter condition was
necessary because the same troops had been fighting against US troops earlier
during the invasion. Currently, the Iraqi government has taken over paying the
militia. 125
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The Wolf Brigade was started in October 2004 by Abu Walid, a nom de
guerre. Walid is an ISCI member and a former three-star general. This brigade
consists of about 2,000 predominantly young Shiite men from Sadr City.126
Although they dress much like the Saddam Hussein‘s Republican Guard, in red
berets and olive colored uniforms, they have been performing operations in Mosul
against the resident Sunni population. The Wolf Brigade members earn roughly
$400 per month, and though they are not usually paid by the US, there is much
cooperation between the two.127 The Wolf Brigade is so well known in Iraq that, not
only do they have their own TV show – Terrorism in the Grip of Justice - which
shows them capturing insurgents and questioning them, yet allegedly the US troops
use their name as a threat should any prisoners refuse to cooperate. This militia is
extremely controversial, especially since the execution of six Sunni clerics has
further heightened tensions.128 The television show, which appears on a US-funded
Iraqi station, has been heavily criticized by the international community because it
violates the Geneva Convention by publicly humiliating detainees.129
A potential problem with the two brigades is that they are based on sectarian
or ethnic identities. Therefore, it could be construed as discrimination if one of the
militias entered an area populated with a different sect or ethnicity. Due to their
often tribal identities, it is questionable whether or not they are loyal to the
national government.130 Furthermore, not all of these militias can be officially
integrated into the security forces of Iraq. Many of the Sunni brigades worry that
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they will not be among the chosen ones to be integrated because of their different
faiths.131 This could lead to civil war because the Sunnis would feel disenfranchised.
Conversely, if there were Sunni brigades integrated, it could also spark sectarian
warfare among other groups. Kurds would be especially worried due to their
previous relationship with Sunni forces.132
Whichever brigades are left out of the integration process will also lose faith
in the government, according to the Iraqi Defense Minister, and could also give
these groups, which are now armed, a reason to rebel.133 In October 2010, rumors
began about the al-Sahwa forces defecting to al-Qaeda because of their nonintegration into the security forces.134 These rumors have been strongly denied by
the leaders who claim that al-Sahwa is there to rid Iraq of terrorists and have
already sacrificed a large number of their members in their effort.135 Furthermore,
many of the al-Sahwa members have been integrated across various agencies while
others have been recruited for civilian jobs within the government.136 Clearly Iraq is
in an extremely precarious position; however, lacking another option regarding the
security of such a large country, it seems that this is the most appropriate choice for
today.
Iraq could pull these militias and brigades together in order to combat
Iranian interference, particularly in southern Iraq, where Iranian influence is most
prominent. There are calls for Iraq to cleanse the south of the Quds force and Iran
in general, as well as petitions circulating calling for a UN investigation into
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Iranian meddling in Iraq. The initial call came from Sheik Jasim al-Kadhim,
president of the Association of Nationalist and Independent Iraqi Tribes, who
claims that the only solution for Iraq is the ousting of the encroaching Iranian
regime. The petition has thus far been signed by 14 members of the clergy, upwards
of 600 sheiks and roughly 25,000 women of southern Iraq.137 Additionally, over
300,000 Iraqi Shiites signed another petition to end Iranian terrorism in Iraq.138 In
order to combat the Iranian influence in the south, the Iraqi government could
dispatch joint forces made up of official security forces and Shiite brigades –
theoretically avoiding sectarian violence.

Political Options
Along with military steps that the Iraqi government could take to curb the
influence of the IRGC, there are also political steps. Of course, this requires
navigating a narrow path that could be potentially costly to several members of the
Iraqi government, especially when many of them are Shiite and have, thus far, been
loyal to Iran. Within the political arena of Iraq, there are already those who
disagree with the pervasive Iranian influence, including current Prime Minister
Nouri Al- Maliki. Although Maliki has praised Iran previously for its help in
reconstructing Iraq, as well as combating terrorism139, Maliki has harbored
resentment towards Iran.
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In Maliki‘s case in particular, after fleeing to Iran to avoid being assassinated
by Hussein, Maliki began to work for the IRGC who was engaging in attempting to
assassinate Hussein and topple the Sunni government during the Iran-Iraq War.140
During one of his covert runs, he needed a clearance to get into a border area;
however, he was sent on a twelve-hour drive to speak to another official who
promptly denied his application. Later, when Saddam was threatening to airstrike
the refugee town of Ahwaz – where many of the Iraqi refugees had fled to during
one of Saddam‘s many purges of the Da‘wa Party – Maliki, a member of said party,
had to transport his wife, who had just given birth and had an IV in her arm, to
another city since no Iranian would come to help.141 Events like those have caused
Maliki to have a deep distrust for the Iranians.
The Da‘wa Party, although Shiite, is an Iraqi party. Iran took Da‘wa Party
members in and gave them an abandoned oil camp near the Iranian city, Ahwaz, to
make their home. Other Da‘wa members who defected from Saddam‘s Army
military trained the nonmilitary refugees.142 However, the Da‘wa members and Iran
came to an impasse when the Iranians continued to try to take over the guerillas
and lead the war against Saddam. Another crucial point was that the refugees
disliked the Islamic government that Iran had. Out of this conflict, the ISCI was
born, with some members of Da‘wa joining but most refusing and/or dropping out.
Maliki was one of those who refused.143
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Though Iran does exert influence, there are Iraqi leaders who are less than
thrilled at the prospect of taking orders from Iran, particularly because of the ArabPersian divide, but also because Iran still pursues its own national interests with
very little regard to Iraq despite the shared Shiite faith. In return, Iraq has begun
using Iran as a threat to its Arab neighbors in order to gain some benefits. Since
becoming Prime Minister of Iraq, Maliki has been attempting to put further
separate himself from Iran. In 2004 and 2005, many Shiite politicians were running
for government positions on the platform of independence from Iran because they
were aware that their constituency base would be eroded should they not separate
from Iran.144
ISCI had also been doing well in elections throughout Iraq, but in the
January 2009 elections the Da‘wa Party managed to defeat the ISCI in local
elections. 145 With tensions rising, Iran has been insisting that Maliki work with
the ISCI.146 Though Maliki is willing to have a coalition, it is unlikely that he will
allow Iran to dictate the direction the coalition will go. In addition, a coalition with
Maliki leading the way just may help separate Iraq‘s interests from Iran. Despite
the ties between Iraq‘s political parties and Iran, the ISCI and the Da‘wa Party do
remain nationalist and thus, are likely to resist direct, or indirect, orders from Iran.
If all else fails, Iraq has political checks in place to prevent religion from being the
main source of law in Iraq.147
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However, continuing to state their opposition to the Iranian government
being entrenched in Iraqi affairs could prove troublesome for the stability of the
nation. The more Iraq tries to assert its independence from Iran, the more Iranians
can fuel the fire of the armed conflicts in Iraq to cause even more instability in this
fragile government.148 Tehran has supplied weapons to the Shiite insurgency, but
has not provided many sophisticated weapons, nor does it attack US forces nearly
as often as it attack Sunni militias.149

Economic Options
Economically, Iraq has to take many steps to curb Iranian influence. As
shown in Chapter 3, Iran has become entrenched in the Iraqi economy, either
through providing reconstruction funds or supplying electricity. Although Iraq has
benefitted from these donations from the IRGC, it has also indebted them to the
IRGC. For this reason, Iraq has to try to diversify its incoming funding for
reconstruction.
One step Iraq could take is to appeal to the United Nations and other states
to assist it with reconstruction. Although this would put Iraq in debt to several
nations – though debt is unavoidable at this point – Iraq would not be beholden to
one state to repay its debts. Thus, one state could not control the direction that Iraq
takes. Compromises would have to be made and Iraq would be inclined to be a more
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centrist country, as far as policy making. However, most immediate is Iraq‘s need
to stop receiving its electricity from Iran. As Iran has already proved, it is willing to
turn the electricity off, should Iraq divert from Iranian plans. Iraq has to
reconstruct or build new electricity grids and control the electricity itself.
Iraq should also curb the Iranian influence by reinstituting tariffs on
imported goods – particularly from Iran, but for the sake of fairness, to every nation
that wants to sell its product in Iraq. Perhaps Iraq could lower taxes to nations who
helped the reconstruction process, so it can insulate its domestic businesses in order
to make them strong again. Iran is undermining the local businesses, causing Iraq
to be increasingly more dependent on it and its products because they are sold at
such low prices. The head of the Kurdistan Contractors‘ Association, Nowruz alKhaffaf, says that he wants the Iraqi government to protect local farmers by
limiting Iranian imports.150
Realistically speaking, however, it is highly unlikely that Iraq can completely
disregard the role of Iran in the state, nor is that a goal that Iraq wants to achieve.
Therefore, there are steps that both Iraq and Iran can take to achieve a medium
that can reasonably please all parties. Some suggest that the United States should
form a working relationship with Iran in order to promote and keep stability in
Iraq. By no means should the United States ignore Iran‘s goals in Iraq. However,
considering the extensive violence and instability present in the nation, assistance
from neighboring countries would be invaluable.151 In addition, as suggested above,
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the United States should help form a coalition among all of Iraq‘s neighbors which
would serve as an informal committee in order to advise the blossoming Iraqi
government and which would brief the committee on a regular basis. 152
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

Understanding how the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – and Iran as a
whole – is affecting Iraq is crucial in understanding what path Iraq must take in
order to combat it. It is also invaluable for other nations to understand the ongoing
effects in order to be able to assist Iraq, should they request it. Assistance, whether
military, political, or economic, may have to be an option for Iraq due to its current
instability coupled with the immense strength of the IRGC. However, this is not to
imply that the United States is solely responsible for this assistance although it
may be partially necessary for a time.
Iran has been training members for the IRGC in its own country for 32 years.
Between the Quds, the Baseej, and the three branches of IRGC forces, Iran is
strongly entrenched in Iranian life. The Baseej militia, in particular, has had the
most domestic effect. Indoctrination begins at a very young age, with the Pupils.153
Thus, the IRGC ensures its ideas are incorporated at every level of a citizen‘s life.
As a whole, the IRGC is especially powerful today since President Ahmadinejad has
appointed several key members to state-level and gubernatorial positions.154
Furthermore, several members of the IRGC have been specifically targeted by UN
resolutions as having key positions in Iran‘s quest for nuclear capabilities.155
Alternatively, the Quds force has had great power outside of Iran‘s borders, carrying
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out international missions and training others who engage in terrorist activities,
such as Hezbollah and JAM, under Sadr. The Quds have been especially successful
in causing further unrest in Iraq, through funding several Shiite militias and
providing several weapons.156
Furthermore, the Quds are using Shiite militias not only to attack Sunnis
but also to combat US soldiers, who are compared to Israelis that occupy Palestine.
Many of the militias in Iraq being funded by the IRGC are receiving between half a
million and 3 million dollars per year for arms and training.157 It is increasingly
difficult for the Iraqi military and the United States to combat the increasing
number of Quds members in Iraq, as well as the militias on their payroll.
Politically, Iraq is in a precarious position because many members of the
government were once Iraqi exiles in Iran. Therefore, once the debaathification
process took place, it was simple to have a Shiite majority win the elections and
thus, have many members who feel beholden to Iran. The situation is made even
more complex when one considers that Sadr, the radical cleric leader of JAM, is
included in the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA)158 and was a force to be reckoned with in
the negotiation arena. The last two Iraqi Prime Ministers, including Nouri alMaliki, are members of the Da‘wa Party.159 The Da‘wa Party was started by Iraqi
exiles in Iran and assisted by the Quds until a fall out which split the party into
Da‘wa and ISCI.160
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Economically, Iran is doing the most damage to Iraq. Because Iraq does not
impose import tariffs, and Iran subsidizes all its exports to Iraq, many of Iraq‘s
domestic industries are failing at a rapid pace. This is especially dangerous because
of the spike in unemployment, which significantly heightens the likelihood of Iraqi
men joining militias in order to support their families. Furthermore, Iran has
opened several banks in cities around Iraq, one of which – Bank Melli – has been
tagged as a source of the Quds funding and also the purchaser of materials for
Iran‘s nuclear ambitions.161
Iran‘s control of a good portion of the electricity of Iraq has also caused many
problems. Those cities are dependent on Iran to function and, in that situation, it is
extremely difficult to combat the IRGC‘s influence when they can just simply shut
the power to entire cities, as Basra was shown.162 Iranian electricity is also
projected to grow in subsequent years, something which Iraq should seek to avoid
with fervor. It is crucial for Iraq to have control of its electricity in order to not be
forced to subject itself to the IRGC.
Socially, the IRGC is already taking over in many areas of Iraq, particularly
the South. Women are being forced to wear hijab and unaccompanied, unmarried
couples are being harassed, beaten, or even killed.163 Furthermore, since Iran is
funding reconstruction efforts for Najaf and Karbala, it could be attempting to
influence what teachings emerge from the many hawzas there by enforcing a more
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Khomeinist tradition of involvement in politics as opposed to the Quietist tradition
that has been more prominent in Iraq thus far.164
Iran is also using the media to influence the views of many Iraqi. Two
stations in particular, Al-Alam and Al-Sahar, broadcast in Iraq with anti-US and/or
anti-Israel propaganda and both support Hezbollah and Hamas. Although it is
difficult to measure how much of an effect the propaganda is having on public
opinion, media is always a difficult tool to combat, although it is all too easy to
manipulate. Now known as al-Kawthwar, Al-Sahar has been broadcasting as early
as 1997. Although it has remained fairly neutral on Iraqi affairs, it is the most
vehemently anti-Israeli station out of the two mentioned.165
The IRGC is attacking from all sides in Iraq and, despite the assistance from
the US, is becoming increasingly troublesome. Although no sources claim that Iraq
can be completely free from any Iranian influence, as the country is next door, there
are steps that Iraq can take in order to mitigate the level of influence and retain its
autonomy. Militarily, Iraq can continue what the United States has done and hire
some of the already present militias, such as The Wolf Brigade or Al-Sahwa, to oust
the Quds forces from the country.166 Though this is a risky move, because not all of
the militias can be hired permanently into the security forces, at the present time it
is a viable choice. However, Iraq will have to find a way to fairly incorporate a few
members from each ethnic and religious background to the security forces in order
to keep from marginalizing any one group and causing further sectarian violence.
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Iraq will also have to attempt to foster stronger nationalistic identities within
the members of the government in order to end the loyalties that many have
towards Iran. This may be easier to do for some members, such as Maliki, because
despite their friendly rhetoric, they may hold some resentment towards Iran. In
Maliki‘s case, his experience at Ahwaz has created his distrust for Iran, and
particularly the Quds force.167
As mentioned above, Iraq has to acquire and maintain control of all the
electricity in the country. However, Iraq also has to take steps in order to combat
the Iranian takeover of its economy. The simplest way to achieve this is through
import tariffs. Iraq could also achieve this by diversifying where it gets its funding
for different projects. For example, it may create incentives for different nations to
invest in reconstruction projects by lowering some tariffs, but never so much so that
it enables said nation to sell its product for less than the equivalent domestic good.
The case study of Iraq, as it is being affected by the IRGC, is clearly
composed of many complicated, interwoven aspects. Each area where the IRGC
pushes its influence in affects multiple areas of Iraqi life – such as political,
military, economic, and social spheres, as portrayed in the following table:
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Table 1: IRGC Effects on Iraq
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Because of IRGC‘s ongoing political influence, the Iraqi government is more
accepting towards engaging in talks and agreements with Iran. Though this is not
necessarily a negative occurrence, it can prove to be detrimental towards Iraq,
should Iran gain most of the benefits from the agreements. One such agreement
between the nations is assurances that Iraq will prevent the Mujahedin Khalq
Organization (MEK) – Iranian exiles in Iraq – from crossing into Iran while Iran
prevents terrorists groups from entering Iraq through Iran.168 However, the
agreement is rather one sided given that the Quds are supplying weapons to Iraqi
militia groups, thus funding the terrorists that are already present.
In addition, Iran‘s political influence on Iraqi leaders is proving to have a
stronger effect. During Jalal Talabani‘s presidency, he was able to visit Tehran and
meet with President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.169
Talabani was the first Iraqi to be able to visit Iran in nearly forty years, fueling US
concerns about the growing closeness between the two nations. Many leaders are
speaking about how Iran and Iraq will only grow closer and few are speaking out
about the growing pervasive Iranian presence.170
In the economy, the IRGC‘s political influence is preventing Iraq from
passing legislation that would create protections for Iraq‘s domestic goods. Although
this would be helpful for Iraq to save its economy, it would end Iran‘s hold on it;
thus, it is not conducive to Iranian aspirations. Iran‘s subsidies on its goods enables
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it to have cheaper prices than domestic goods while their import tariff of 150%
keeps Iraqi goods out of Iran.171
The masses are also affected by the political influence because of the Shiite
led government. Shiites voted for Shiites in Iraq during the election and, with a
Shiite majority, a Shiite government was elected. Many of the members were
previous exiles in Iran. The masses are being affected by the lack of action of the
government to protect them against the IRGC‘s influence. Furthermore, the Iranian
TV stations that broadcast anti-Israeli and anti-US propaganda in Iraq only serve
to heighten the tensions and influence public opinion towards violence.
The IRGC‘s military influence in Iraq causes no fewer problems. The Iraqi
government has to feel the brunt of the violence the IRGC promotes and funds.
Furthermore, with the militias already having significant influence, it is difficult for
the Iraqi government to attempt containment or expulsion for fear that said militias
will only incite more violence and unrest. Iraqi leaders are aware that the IRGC
funded militias could easily cause more instability in Iraq and therefore, are
reluctant to induce any major change that may provoke them. Without assistance
from other nations, it is unlikely that this pattern will change.
The Iraqi economy is also affected by the military because any instability
within a nation is going to cause dramatic change to its economy. The constant
violence causes lack of employment and stable income, leading Iraqis to buy the
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cheapest goods possible. The cheapest goods in Iraq are Iranian goods due to
previously discussed subsidies. In a vicious cycle, the Iraqi public is affected because
they must buy cheap Iranian goods, which does not give the economy any chance to
grow and stabilize itself.
The religious and social influence that the IRGC is having on Iraq further
destabilizes the society by holding power over the Shiite government and causing
the leaders of the government to support Iran, one of Iran‘s goals. The social
influence, particularly in the South, may cause a change in social values regarding
the economy and causing it to remain weak in comparison to Iran and other
surrounding nations. Also, the IRGC has swept into southern Iraq and has begun
imposing Sharia law on the citizens.172 With the effect that the IRGC has had on
the government, the Sunni minority is now becoming marginalized, and in some
cases targeted, by their own government. The religious aspect of the IRGC is one of
the most difficult to combat because a close link exists between those of the Shiite
faith due to their persistent minority within the Muslim world.
Finally, the IRGC‘s economic influence can be felt throughout Iraq. The Iraqi
government and leaders are unwilling to combat the economic influence through
tariffs due to the lack of strength of Iraq‘s economy, but also because of the threat of
escalating violence by the IRGC. With this lack of protectionist policies, the Iraqi
economy continues to plummet, continuing the cycle of dependence upon Iranian
goods and services.173 Many businesses are failing because they cannot compete
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with Iranian goods and much of the public is unemployed and willing to work for
violent militias if it means they can feed their families.
In attempting to ascertain in what ways the IRGC is influencing Iraq and
how much power they already hold, it is daunting to find that their power is
continually growing. Furthermore, in trying to find a way to combat the situation,
one is only faced with more questions. How can Iraq combat the military influence
of Iran without causing more damage to an already unstable economy and public
space? How can Iraq diversify its funds for reconstruction so as not to be beholden
to Iran? These questions lead one to conjecture about Iraq‘s future as a nation and
its place as an autonomous, self-reliant country in the eyes of the world. Further
studies should be undertaken to examine the questions that have arisen from this
research. However, one truth will remain: Iraq, and the IRGC, will continue to be a
source of much debate and many studies for years to come.
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